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The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB or 
Board) is to establish independence standards applicable to 
the audits of public entities in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets.  Two of the founding precepts of the 
ISB are that (1) while many factors may affect the functioning 
of the capital markets, those markets will not function 
effectively unless investors have confidence in the information 
they use to make investment decisions, and (2) an 
independent audit is essential to providing that sense of 
confidence.  If knowledgeable and reasonable investors 
believed that the independent auditor placed the interests of 
the accounting firm, the audit client, or any other person, 
over the interests of investors, then the value of the audit 
function would be impaired. 
 
 
With this mission in mind, and while working concurrently on 
its project to establish a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence to serve as a foundation for principles-based 
independence standards, the Board has, in a limited scope 
and expedited project, studied certain independence concerns 
related to the audit of mutual funds and related entities.  The 
Board seeks comment on its proposal for Certain 
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and 
Related Entities, as described in this Exposure Draft (ED).  
 
The operating policies of the ISB are designed to permit 
timely, thorough and open study of issues involving auditor 
independence, and to encourage broad public participation in 
the process of establishing and improving independence 
standards.  All of the ISB’s constituencies, including members 
of the public, are encouraged to express their views on 
matters under consideration in order to stimulate 
constructive public dialogue. 
 
The ISB is seeking specific input on the questions posed on 
page 12 of this ED.  In addition, we welcome comments and 
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suggestions on any other aspects of this proposal. 
 
Any individual or organization may obtain one copy of this 
Exposure Draft (ED 99-1), without charge, by contacting the 
ISB.  The ED is also available on the ISB website at 
www.cpaindependence.org. 
 
Your responses, which must be received by October 31, 1999 
may be sent via: 
 
 1. mail Independence Standards Board 
   6th Floor 
   1211 Avenue of the Americas 
   New York, NY 10036-8775 
 2. fax  (212) 596-6137 
 3. e-mail isb@cpaindependence.org 
Please reference ED 99-1 in your correspondence. 
 
All responses will be available for public inspection and 
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence 
Standards Board and also at the library of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Harborside 
Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, New Jersey.  
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Summary 
 
 
 
 
(Please note: Terms appearing for the first time in bold type are defined in the 
Glossary.) 
 
The proposed Independence Standard would, as described in more detail 
herein:  
 
 require the audit firm, certain of its retirement plans, the audit engagement 
team (considered broadly) and certain others, when the firm is auditing 
mutual funds, to be independent of all sister funds and all related non-
fund entities. In addition, when auditing a related non-fund entity, 
independence would be required by the same entities and individuals of all 
funds in the mutual fund complex. 
 
 permit: 
A.  direct investment in non-audit client sister funds by all other partners 
and employees of the firm. 
 
B.  spouses and dependents of partners, other than of the engagement team 
and in a work office, to invest through an employee benefit plan in mutual 
funds that are audit clients. 
 
 be effective with respect to audits of financial statements for periods 
beginning after June 15, 2000, with earlier application encouraged. 
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Proposed Independence Standard 
 
Certain Independence Implications of 
Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities 
 
September 1999 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose 
 
1. The purpose of this project is to provide standards by which the 
independence of the audit firm and its partners and employees from mutual 
fund complexes may be established.  The primary issues are whether 
knowledgeable and reasonable investors believe that (a) investments by 
certain partners of an audit firm in non-client funds within a mutual fund 
complex, or (b) investments through an employee benefit plan by the 
spouses and dependents of such partners in client mutual funds create 
conflicting interests that compromise the credibility of the auditor’s reports 
on the financial statements of the entities it audits.  The corporate 
governance and legal structure of mutual funds and mutual fund complexes 
are unique as are the independence issues affecting auditors of mutual 
funds and their affiliates.  Accordingly, the guidance provided by this 
standard, when finalized, will apply only to entities within mutual fund 
complexes which are subject to the independence requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and are not to be analogized to 
other circumstances affecting auditors’ independence. 
 
Background 
 
2. During deliberation at its March 12, 1999 meeting, the Board agreed that 
the mutual fund issues described below should be added to its project 
agenda and that the project should be expedited by moving directly to an 
Exposure Draft (ED).  The project had been recommended in a letter of the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC and also requested through practice 
experience. 
 
Project Issue 
 
3. The project is limited in scope and focuses on three issues—within a mutual 
fund complex, when is auditor independence required: 
 
A.  As to non-client “sister funds,” when auditing a fund? 
(e.g., as to non-client Fund A, when auditing Fund B advised by the 
same investment adviser) 
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B.  As to related non-client funds, when auditing a related non-fund entity? 
(e.g., as to non-client Fund A, when auditing a broker-dealer in the same 
complex) 
 
 
C.  As to all related non-fund entities, when auditing one or more mutual 
funds? 
(e.g., as to a broker-dealer or ultimate parent, when auditing Fund B in 
the same complex.)  
 
4. The Board’s general rules (the SEC rules adopted at the commencement of 
the Board) require an audit firm, and its “members” (as defined), to be 
independent of its audit clients.  This general independence requirement is 
not changed by the proposed standard, except as to paragraph 13.  
 
RISKS OR CONFLICTS 
 
5. There are risks or conflicts that need to be considered in establishing 
guidelines for independence with respect to entities within mutual fund 
complexes.  Those areas relate principally to the organization that has 
access to information and has influence over the financial operations and 
reporting of the mutual fund, which is typically the mutual fund’s 
investment adviser.  It is in the area of valuation of the mutual fund’s assets 
and in the investment decision-making process that the most sensitivity 
would exist toward undue influence being placed on an auditor’s judgment.  
Specifically, the following areas would be considered risk areas that should 
be considered in establishing the guidelines for independence with respect 
to entities within mutual fund complexes: 
 
 An auditor may encounter a systemic problem during the course of 
auditing one mutual fund in a complex that would adversely impact 
another non-client fund in the complex that is held by other individuals 
in the firm as a direct investment or held through the firm’s defined 
contribution retirement plan. 
 
 An auditor may encounter an issue during the course of auditing an 
investment adviser that would adversely impact investments held by 
others at the firm in mutual funds sponsored by the adviser. 
 
 An individual in the firm’s chain of command may influence an auditor’s 
judgment with respect to an audit of a fund within a mutual fund 
complex where that individual has an investment. 
 
In each of the aforementioned situations, an auditor might be reluctant to 
promptly recommend a resolution of a problem if resolution might adversely 
impact the mutual funds held as investments by his or her associates. 
 
6. A conflict may also arise where certain members of the audit firm act for the 
firm as fiduciaries over the firm’s 401(k) plan at the same time other 
members of the firm audit the investment adviser or mutual funds in the 
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same mutual fund complex.  Conflicts may arise between the audit firm’s 
duty of confidentiality to the audit client and the audit firm’s duty as 
fiduciary to the participants in the firm’s 401(k) plan. 
 
7. In order to maintain public confidence, the profession also requires that an 
auditor be independent in both fact and appearance.  Consequently, 
consideration must also be given to whether auditing funds or entities in a 
mutual fund complex, while the auditing firm or persons associated with the 
firm invest in funds that are not audit clients, creates the appearance of a 
lack of independence. 
 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT CHRONOLOGY 
 
8. A Board Oversight Task Force was appointed to provide direction to the 
project.  Under its guidance, a broad-based Project Task Force was formed 
and met on June 3, 1999.  Among other matters, it reviewed a neutral Board 
Discussion Paper developed by the ISB staff and designed  to assist the 
Board in assessing the  issues raised and possible solutions. 
 
9. After considering this matter at its June 25, 1999 meeting, the ISB 
unanimously agreed on the principles underlying this draft Independence 
Standard and delegated to its Oversight Task Force the authority to 
supervise and approve the issuance of this proposal after consultation with 
the Chief Accountant of the SEC.  At the request of the Oversight Task 
Force, the draft ED was also reviewed for clarity with the Board’s Project 
Task Force on August 27, 1999.  
 
INDEPENDENCE STANDARD 
 
Applicability 
 
10. This standard applies to the determination of auditor independence with 
respect to audits of mutual funds and related entities which are subject to 
the independence requirements of the SEC. 
 
Standard 
 
11. The auditing firm will not be considered independent of any entity within the 
mutual fund complex if the partners in the firm, either individually or 
collectively, have significant influence over any entity in that complex. 
  
12. In other situations: 
 
 The auditing firm itself, and its retirement plans (other than self-directed 
defined contribution employee benefit plans, such as 401(k) plans), and 
 
 The audit engagement team and its chain of command, and the 
partners and managerial employees in offices participating in a 
significant portion of the audit, when the firm is auditing: 
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 a fund, must be independent of  all sister funds. 
 
 a related non-fund entity, must be independent of all related non-client 
funds—that is, all funds in the complex.1  
 
 one or more funds, must be independent of all related non-fund 
entities in the mutual fund complex.2  
 
13. A spouse, cohabitant or dependent of a partner not on the engagement 
team, not in its chain of command, and not in an office participating in a 
significant portion of the engagement, is permitted to invest through an 
employer-sponsored benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients of 
the firm. 
  
Effective Date 
 
14. The above requirements are effective with respect to audits of financial 
statements for periods beginning after June 15, 2000, with earlier 
application encouraged. 
 
BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
15. The Board’s desire is to provide guidance in mutual fund auditor 
independence issues to help ensure, in a rapidly changing environment, the 
continued integrity of audited financial statements for the ultimate benefit of 
investors and other users of those statements.  To accomplish this goal and 
develop a prudent and balanced standard, the ISB weighed a variety of 
significant factors, some of which are described below, in reaching its 
determination of an appropriate Independence Standard for Certain 
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities.  
It is believed that the Standard will also significantly reduce a perceived lack 
of clarity in present guidance, and thereby reduce likely diversity in practice.  
 
Attributes of Mutual Fund Organization Structure 
 
16. The organizational structure of a mutual funds complex (See 
Appendices A and B) varies significantly from that of a typical 
corporation, and the Board believes these differences are relevant to 
the setting of auditor independence standards.  Specifically, SEC 
Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01 (b) states that auditor independence is 
                                          
1 If the related non-fund entity is an investment adviser (or sub-adviser), the auditor 
must be independent of all funds it advises, even if they are outside this mutual fund 
complex. 
2 If the fund’s investment adviser (or sub-adviser) is outside the mutual fund complex, 
the independence requirement still applies.   That independence restriction further 
extends to any parent company to which the investment adviser is material, and to all 
other subsidiaries of those covered parent companies. 
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required as to the client and “…any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or 
other affiliates…”, but the typical fund/adviser relationship is not 
that of a subsidiary/parent.  Among the principal differences are that: 
 
A.  In an investment adviser/mutual fund relationship, there is no 
majority ownership or voting control, as typically is present of 
a parent in a subsidiary, and  
 
B. Unlike the case of a subsidiary, the investment income of a 
mutual fund, after the deduction of adviser management fees, 
and other expenses is distributed to the fund shareholders as 
opposed to the related investment adviser. 
 
On the other hand while not having voting control of a fund, the 
investment adviser usually provides the fund's officers and performs 
substantially all services required in its operations, and thus plays an 
important, even controlling, role in its policies and operations. 
 
Analysis of Common Service Providers 
 
17. Mutual funds often use common service providers, to centralize services and 
thereby control costs, and the Board believes such common services are 
relevant to the related independence issues.  In analyzing the key factors 
and threats relevant to the sister fund issue, the Board concluded that the 
use among funds of a common investment adviser was an important enough 
link to provide the basis for the independence restriction.  The Board also 
considered the providers of other common services, including fund boards of 
directors and accounting systems, but concluded they were less relevant 
than a common investment adviser and that the independence restriction 
should be based solely on the presence of common investment advisers. 
 
Difference between Defined Benefit and 
Defined Contribution Plan Investments 
 
18. The Board distinguished between the firm-directed investments of firm 
defined benefit plans and the self-directed investment choices available in 
certain firm defined contribution plans (such as 401(k) plans), and 
concluded that the risks differed sufficiently to provide a lesser restriction 
for certain personnel in the defined contribution plans.  That is, the direct 
beneficiary of investment performance in a defined benefit plan is the firm 
sponsor, since the level of further firm contributions will be affected by the 
investment performance.  By contrast, the direct beneficiary of investment 
performance in a defined contribution plan is the employee.  As a result, the 
Board concluded that the firm’s defined benefit plans should not be able to 
invest in sister funds, but that the firm could offer a sister fund investment 
alternative in its defined contribution plans to non-involved partners and 
staff without impairing its independence. 
 
Partner Spousal Employee Benefit Plan Investments 
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19. The Board recognizes that permitting investments through employer-
sponsored benefit plans by partners’ spouses in mutual funds that are audit 
clients is not consistent with the present rules.  However, the Board also 
believes this change to be warranted as a practical good in this changing 
social environment, and that the risk that such investments will adversely 
affect audit quality appears trivial.  A number of factors were considered in 
reaching this conclusion, including the following:  
 
A.  Many more spouses are working today; 
B.  Benefit plans (especially 401(k)s) have become much more common;  
C.  Audits of the mutual funds in those plans have become more 
concentrated within a few large firms due to consolidation of both 
financial institutions and auditors;  
D.  A number of plans provide only one family of mutual fund 
investments.  Under existing rules, if the funds are audit clients of a 
firm, the spouses and dependents of all partners in the firm would 
be prohibited from participating in the plans.  As a result, the person 
would lose tax deferral benefits and employer matching 
contributions, and sometimes have to forfeit accumulated benefits; 
and 
E.  It is highly unlikely that those who are exempted could influence the 
audit.  
 
This decision will be reconsidered when the Board addresses the question of 
investment in audit clients comprehensively.  (It also is noted that existing 
AICPA rules provide certain limitations, including as to immateriality, on 
such spousal investments, and such rules would need to be conformed 
before the above exemption could become effective.) 
 
Analysis of Other Bases for Evaluating Independence Restrictions 
 
20. In addition to considering the commonality of service providers for sister 
funds as described above, the Board also considered other and broader 
alternative bases for evaluating auditor independence in the mutual fund 
environment.  For example, various applications of materiality tests were 
considered, as was the application of independence restrictions on a case-
by-case basis to counter specific threats.  The Board concluded that its 
proposed standard better fulfills its needs, in part because it provides a 
simpler but effective approach to addressing the independence threats 
raised. 
  
Risks/Threats and Safeguards Analysis 
 
21. In view of the importance of a risks/threats analysis and the need for  
related safeguards, the Board considered extensively the potential for 
particular independence concerns, including those described in paragraphs 
5 and 6, which might occur during the audits of mutual funds and their 
related entities.  The general concerns--the possible loss of objectivity in the 
audit and the need for independence to be perceived as well--are discussed 
in paragraph 7.  The Board’s determination was that while some threats 
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could be envisioned specific to mutual fund-related situations, any 
remaining threats to the auditor’s independence, after the application of this 
standard, were insignificant, especially considering existing controls. 
 
Summary 
 
22. Based upon: (a) its consideration of the unique organizational structure of 
mutual fund entities; (b) the differences inherent in self-directed defined 
contribution employee benefit plans; (c) the lack of apparent significant 
independence risk from mutual fund audits; and (d) the apparent very 
limited threats to auditor independence from spouses and dependents 
outside a work office participating in an employer-sponsored benefit plan, 
the Board believes its proposal is appropriately restrictive to protect the 
public interest and be responsive to those threats that were envisioned, 
while not imposing restrictions on those other individuals and plans where 
the Board believes the risks are minimal. 
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QUESTIONS FOR RESPONDENTS 
 
Q1. The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister 
funds by an expanded “on the engagement” group, in addition to all 
partners and managerial employees in offices participating in a 
significant portion of the audit.  As a result, the proposal will permit 
investments in such other funds by all other partners.  Is this proposal 
appropriate, too restrictive, or not restrictive enough?  Please provide the 
basis for your views, including the applicable threats to independence. 
 
Q2.    A.  As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the 
Board believes that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is 
sufficiently different from the relationship of a parent and its subsidiary, 
as described in paragraph 16, to warrant only the restrictions proposed.  
Do you agree that these relationship differences are substantive enough 
to support the Board’s proposal?  Or, do you believe that investment 
advisers have strong enough operating control over, or financial interests 
relating to, the funds they advise to be more like a parent/subsidiary 
relationship, and therefore require additional independence restrictions 
and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest? 
 
 B.  As described in paragraph 17, the Board concluded that the 
commonality of an investment adviser among funds was of primary 
importance in analyzing the sister fund issue, believing that the limited 
independence threats envisioned are appropriately addressed in the 
proposed restrictions.  Do you instead believe even if the investment 
advisers are different, if other common services are utilized, that 
additional independence restrictions should be required and, if so, why, 
and what restrictions do you suggest? 
 
Q3.    The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 
address extending restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex 
for certain fund/adviser relationships.  Do you believe these extensions 
are warranted and extend to the appropriate levels?  
 
Q4.  The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-
directed defined contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 
401(k) plans) with non-client sister fund choices available to all but the 
engagement team, its chain of command, and certain others.  Do you 
believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an 
appropriate basis for this distinction from direct investments and the 
firm’s defined benefit plans (which may not hold such funds)? 
 
Q5. The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other 
than of the engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work 
office, to invest through an employee benefit plan in mutual funds that 
are audit clients. Do you agree that the threats to audit quality are 
sufficiently remote to support this exemption?  Would it make a 
difference if the investment grew to an amount that is material to the 
partner? 
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Q6. The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear 
to be modest, while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of 
potential risk, but flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, appears 
appropriate.  Do your agree or disagree with this statement, and why?  If 
you disagree, please offer your suggestions for change.  
 
Q7. One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research in 
the development of principles-based independence standards.  Are you 
aware of any relevant research, either available or that you suggest be 
commissioned, on the specific topic of auditor independence with respect 
to mutual funds?  If so, please advise us. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
(This glossary contains definitions of terms and phrases noted in bold in this 
proposal.) 
 
Chain of command 
 Those who supervise or have direct management responsibility for, 
(including all successively senior levels), or provide technical or industry 
specialized consultation, quality control or other oversight of, the 
partners and staff members involved in the audit.  
 
Investment adviser 
 Manages the mutual fund’s portfolio according to the objectives and 
policies described in the fund’s prospectus, executes its portfolio 
transactions, and typically serves as distributor of its shares to investors. 
 
Managerial employees 
 Staff members in a position having continuing managerial responsibility 
for the overall planning and supervision of engagements for specified 
clients, or authority to determine that an engagement is complete subject 
to final partner approval, if required, or responsibility for client 
relationships, or overall management of the firm, or development or 
implementation of, or compliance with, firm policies on technical matters 
including quality control. 
 
Mutual funds 
 Investment companies subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.  
These include, for example, open-end and closed-end funds, and unit 
investment trusts.   
 
Mutual fund complex 
 The mutual fund operation in its entirety, including all the funds, plus 
the investment adviser, its ultimate parent company, and their 
subsidiaries.  (See Appendix A for an example.) 
 
Non-fund entities 
 For example, the investment adviser, a broker-dealer, a bank, or an 
insurance company in the mutual fund complex. 
 
Sister funds 
 Mutual funds in the complex with an investment adviser common with 
any fund audited by the firm.
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Appendix A 
 
Organization Chart 
The Structure of a Typical Mutual Fund Complex 
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Appendix B 
Organization Chart 
The Structure of a Typical Mutual Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functions 
1. Presentations for the board, SEC filings. 
2. Maintains fund's accounting records, computes net asset value (NAV) daily and 
forwards NAV to Transfer Agent, and prepares the fund's financial statements. 
3. Maintains Shareholder accounting records and issues share certificates. 
4. Conceives, manages and trades the fund. 
5. Manages the fund and executes its portfolio transactions. 
6. Responds to Shareholders' inquiries by accessing records maintained by Transfer 
Agent. 
7. Audits the fund's financial statements. 
8. Legal Services. 
9. Except for the Auditor, the only other entity servicing the fund which (absent 
meeting certain incremental criteria) must be independent and not affiliated.  Holds 
securities in safekeeping; receives and delivers securities as instructed. 
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